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Abstract 
 
Many political scientists have argued, on the basis of extensive quantitative data, that 
democratic governments result in greater spending in health and education and in a 
redistribution of resources in favour of vulnerable groups. Democratic governments are 
also often associated with a decrease in levels of interstate conflict and in internal 
violence. And yet, there are cases – such as Pakistan – in which this has not occurred. 
Why have these ‘democracy dividends’ not been realized in Pakistan? This paper  
addresses some of the reasons why democratic governance in Pakistan has not translated 
into social welfare and peace, and highlights that the impact of democracy is time and 
context-specific. Therefore, greater attention must be devoted to the historical and 
societal peculiarities of each country. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In this paper we will test the dominant theories on the effects of 
democratization by looking at Pakistan, which since its birth in 1947 has seen the 
alternation of unelected civilian governments which allowed for some measure of 
political openness (1947-1958), elected civilian governments characterized by 
multiparty politics and fairly free elections (1970-’77, 1988-’99, 2008 to present), 
military governments arising from coup d’etats (1958-’69, 69-71, 1977-’88, 1999-
2008). However, we have to keep in mind that there are no sharp divisions 
between one period and the other: some military leaders allowed for limited 
periods some level of participatory democracy, including elections (such as those 
for the national and provincial assemblies held on a non-party basis in 1985 under 
Zia ul-Haq, and the general elections held in 2005 under Musharraf), while during 
some democratic phases unelected institutions such as the military influenced 
decision-making. The most glaring example was that of the 1990s, when Benazir 
Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif had to give way to the army in a number of issues; when 
they attempted to exert greater control over the army, they were forced to step 
down. Benazir Bhutto’s government was dismissed twice by the President under 
military pressure, and Nawaz Sharif was removed from his post by a coup in the 
aftermath of the Kargill war. Elections held in the 1990s were characterized 
according to some analysts by bogus votes, intimidation and enticement of voters, 
and tampering of the results at the polling stations. That the passage between 
democratic and undemocratic phases is much more nuanced that it may appear at 
first sight is shown also by the case of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto: Bhutto, the founder 
and head of the PPP, became president and then prime minister following the 
1970 national elections, the first to be held in the country. He allowed 
multipartitism and in 1977 he called for general elections. And yet, we cannot 
consider him an elected leader: first of all, it had been the Awami League -AL 
based in the Eastern wing, not the PPP, that had won the elections in 1970. The 
AL’s leader Mujibur Rahman should have formed the new government. The 
reluctance of the military and civilian elites of the western wing, including Bhutto, 
to recognize the result of the vote precipitated the civil war, which resulted in the 
dismemberment of Pakistan in 1971. Bhutto, whose party had arrived second at 
the general elections, became prime minister in the aftermath of the secession. 
Second, the 1977 elections called by Bhutto were, according to the opposition and 
many analysts, heavily rigged. In sum, the Pakistani case reminds us that there are 
no clear-cut divisions between types of governments. 
In the following pages we will look at the period 1988-1999, one that is usually 
described in western literature as democratic, and assess whether it produced or 
not any welfare dividends. We will then look at the correlation between regime 
type and conflict throughout Pakistani history, with particular attention to internal 
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strife
1
. First, however, we will summarize some of the main findings of the 
existing literature on the consequences of democratization. 
 
2. The literature on the effects of democratization 
 
In the past decades great attention has been devoted to studying through a 
quantitative cross-country approach the effects of democracy. Most scholars 
believe, on the basis of extensive data collected across a wide number of 
countries, that higher degrees of democracy result in more prosperous, egalitarian 
and peaceful societies. It is widely held, for example, that as levels of democracy 
increase, economic growth ensues
2
, though some argue that this relationship is 
more ambiguous
3
. The bulk of existing studies also argue that transitions to 
democracy entail greater commitment on the part of the State to social welfare 
and to the redistribution of resources. Elected governments, in particular, are 
thought to spend more on health and education and to be more pro-poor than 
unelected ones
4
. The results are better performances in welfare indicators
5
 and 
                                              
1
 The following analysis draws from E. Giunchi, Democratic Transition and Social Spending: the 
case of Pakistan in the 1990s, in Democratization, Vol. 18, No. 6, 2011, pp. 1270-1290; E. 
Giunchi, Ethnic Strife and Democratization in Pakistan: Some observations on concepts, 
measurements and the importance of history, in Quaderni Asiatici, Vol. XXXI, No. 106, 2014, pp. 
21-56. 
2
 J. Tavares, R. Wacziarg, How Democracy Affects Growth, in European Economic Review, Vol. 
45, No. 8, 2001, pp. 1341-1378. 
3
 R.J. Barro, Democracy and Growth, in Journal of Economic Growth, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1996, pp. 1-
27. 
4
 M. Ross, Is Democracy Good for the Poor? in American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 50, 
No. 4, 2006, pp. 860-887; D. Stasavage, Democracy and Education Spending in Africa, in 
American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 49, No. 2, 2005, pp. 343–58; R. jr. Kaufman, A. 
Segura-Ubiergo, Globalization, Domestic Politics, and Social Spending in Latin America: A Time-
Series Cross-Section Analysis, 1973–1997, in World Politics, Vol. 53, No. 4, 2001, pp. 553–87; 
D.S. Brown, W. Hunter, Democracy and Social Spending in Latin America, 1980–1992, in 
American Political Science Review, Vol. 93, No. 4, 1999, pp. 779-90; J.M. Nelson, Elections, 
Democracy and Social Services, in Studies in Comparative International Development, Vol. 41, 
No. 4, 2007, pp. 79-97; G. Avelino, D. S. Brown, W. Hunter, The Effects of Capital Mobility, 
Trade Openness, and Democracy on Social Spending in Latin America, 1980–1999,  in American 
Journal of Political Science, Vol. 49, No. 3, 2005, pp. 625-641; D.R. Hecock, Electoral 
Competition, Globalization, and Subnational Education Spending in Mexico, 1999–2004, in 
American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 50, No. 4, 2006, pp. 950-961. 
5
 B. Moon, W.J. Dixon, Politics, the State and Basic Human Needs: A Cross-National Study, in 
American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 29, No. 4, 1985, pp. 661–694; T.D. Zweifel, P. Navia, 
Democracy, Dictatorship, and Infant Mortality, in Journal of Democracy, Vol. 11, No. 2, 2000, 
pp. 99-114; P. Navia, T.D. Zweifel, Democracy, Dictatorship, and Infant Mortality Revisited, in 
Journal of Democracy, Vol. 14, 2003; D.S. Brown, Reading, Writing, and Regime Type: 
Democracy’s Impact on Primary School Enrolment, in Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 52, No. 
4, 1999, pp. 681-707; D.A. Lake, M.A. Baum, The Invisible Hand of Democracy: Political 
Control and the Provision of Public Services, in Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 34, No. 6, 
2001, pp. 587-621; M. Baum, D. Lake, The Political Economy of Growth: Democracy and Human 
Capital, in American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 47, No. 2, 2003, pp. 333-347. 
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positive distributional effects
6
. Contrary to this view, which is corroborated by 
extensive quantitative data, other political scientists find no simple correlation 
between democracy and social welfare: by resorting to a quantitative approach 
they observe that democracies do not necessarily spend more on the social sector 
than authoritarian governments
7
, and that greater government expenditures do not 
in any case necessarily translate into better indicators
8
, nor do they always benefit 
the most vulnerable sectors of society
9
.  
Similar discrepancies are to be found among political scientists studying the 
effects of democratisation on international and internal strife. The bulk of existing 
studies argues that as levels of democracy increase, conflicts between states 
become more rare
10
 and military expenditures, as a consequence, decrease as a 
share of both GNP and total government spending
11
. Again, some studies indicate 
that the relationship between democracy and military spending is quite complex
12
. 
The idea that democratic systems are more likely to promote domestic peace than 
authoritarian systems is also widely-held
13
. Some isolated voices, however, find 
                                              
6
 D. Stasavage, Democracy and Education, cit.; D.S. Brown, W. Hunter, Democracy and Social 
Spending, cit.; D.S. Brown, Reading, cit.. 
7
 C.B. Mulligan, R. Gil, X. Sala-i-Martin, Do Democracies Have Different Public Policies than 
Non Democracies?, in Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 18, No. 1, 2004, pp. 51-74. 
8
 J.M. Nelson, Elections, Democracy, cit.; M. Ross, Is Democracy Good, cit.; D. Filmer, L. 
Pritchett, The Impact of Public Spending on Health: Does Money Matter?, in Social Science and 
Medicine, Vol. 49, No. 1, 1999, pp. 1309-1323; R. Barlow and B. Vissandjee, Determinants of 
National Life Expectancy, Canadian Journal of Development Studies, Vol. 20, No. 1, pp. 9-29; 
J.W. McGuire, Basic Health Care Provision and Under-Five Mortality: A Cross-National Study of 
Developing Countries, in World Development, Vol. 34, No. 3, 2006, pp. 405-425. 
9
 F. Castro-Leal et al., Public Spending on Health Care in Africa: Do the Poor Benefit?, in  
Bulletin of the World Health Organization, Vol. 78, 2000, pp. 66-74. 
10
 P. James, E. Solberg, M. Wolfson, An Identified Systemic Model of the Democracy-Peace 
Nexus, in Defence and Peace Economics, Vol. 10, 1999, pp. 1-38; P. James, E. Solberg, M. 
Wolfson, Democracy and Peace: Reply to Oneal and Russett. Defence and Peace Economics, Vol. 
11, 2000, pp. 215-229; J.R. Oneal, B.M. Russett, The Classical Liberals Were Right: Democracy, 
Interdependence and Conflict, 1950-1985, in International Studies Quarterly, Vol.  41, No. 2, 
1997, pp. 267-294; J. Yidirim, S. Sezgin, Democracy and military expenditure: A cross-country 
evidence, in Transition Studies Review, 2005, Vol. 122, No. 1, pp. 93-100. 
11
 J.H. Lebovic, Spending Priorities and Democratic Rule in Latin America, in Journal of Peace 
Research, Vol. 45, n. 4, 2001, pp.  427-452; J. Yidirim, S. Sezgin, Democracy and military 
expenditure, cit.. 
12
 I.A. Elbadawi, P. Keefer, Democracy, democratic consolidation and military spending, working 
paper 848, ERF, 2014, pp. 1-32. 
13
 I.A. Elbadawi, N. Sambanis, How Much War Will We See? Explaining the prevalence of civil 
war, in Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 46, No. 3, 2002, pp. 307-334; B. Lacina, Explaining 
the Severity of Civil Wars, in Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 50, No. 2, 2006, pp. 276-289; R. 
Nordås, Are Religious Conflicts Bloodier? Assessing the impact of religion on civil conflict 
casualties, Conference paper, ISA 48th Annual Convention. Chicago IL, February 28-March 3, 
2007; N. Sambanis, Do Ethnic and Non-Ethnic Civil Wars Have the Same Causes? A theoretical 
and empirical inquiry, in Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 45, No. 3, 2001, pp. 259-283; T.R. 
Gurr, Peoples Against States: Ethnopolitical conflict and the changing world system, in 
International Security, Vol. 38, 1994, pp. 347-378; D.L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, 
University of California Press, Berkeley - Los Angeles, 1985; M. Bratton, Do free elections foster 
  
 
 
Nuovi Autoritarismi e Democrazie:  
Diritto, Istituzioni, Società  
 
n. 1/ 2019  ISSN 2612-6672 | 130 
 
evidence that democracies are as likely as authoritarian regimes to be affected by 
conflict
14
, if not more
15
. There is a near consensus, however, that hybrid – also 
called semi-democratic or intermediate – regimes are more likely to experience 
internal conflict
16
, as do countries going through a transition to democracy
17
. The 
reasons is that intermediate regimes (and the same can be said about transitional 
regimes) have inherent contradictions stemming from a combination of 
repression, leading to grievances, and openness, facilitating protest. 
Democratic openings can also create expectations that cannot be met and, 
particularly in the early stages of democratization, ethno-nationalist leaders tend 
to emphasize ethnic antagonisms in order to mobilize a support base
18
. While the 
greater freedom of the press that normally accompanies democratization is 
exploited by them to disseminate their ideas, their exclusivist appeals are not 
properly scrutinized as freedom of expression is not fully developed
19
. However, 
transitions to democracy do not always entail violence, and stable western 
democracies have a record of subverting, directly or indirectly, elected 
governments abroad, though fuelling violence abroad is not captured by available 
data on the correlation between democracy and violence. Democratic 
governments, including western ones, may also co-exist with powerful unelected 
institutions and interest groups and with clientelistic networks.  
                                                                                                                              
capable government? The democracy-governance connection in Africa, in Afrobarometer, 
Working Paper No. 104, 2008, pp. 331-354; M. Sørli, N.P. Gleditsch, H. Strand, Why is There So 
Much Conflict in the Middle East?, in The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 49, No. 1, 2005, 
pp. 141-165; N. Glazer, Democracy and Deep Divides, in Journal of Democracy, Vol. 21, No. 2, 
2010, pp. 5-19. 
14
 G.D. Fearon, D.D. Laitin, Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War, in American Political Science 
Review, Vol. 97, No. 1, 2003, pp. 84-85. 
15
 S.M. Saideman et al., Democratization, Political Institutions, and Ethnic Conflict: A pooled, 
cross-sectional time series analysis from 1985-1998, in Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 35, 
No. 1, 2002, p. 118; E.N. Muller, E. Weede, Cross-National Variations in Political Violence: A 
rational action approach, in Journal of conflict resolution, Vol. 34, 1990, pp. 624-51.  
16
 T. Ellingsen, Toward a Revival of Religion and Religious Clashes?, in Terrorism and Political 
Violence, Vol. 17, No. 3, 2005, pp. 305-332; T. Ellingsen, Colorful community or ethnic witches’ 
brew? Multiethnicity and domestic conflict during and after the cold war, in Journal of Conflict 
Resolution, Vol. 44, No. 2, 2000, pp. 228-249; H. Hegre et al., Toward a Democratic Civil Peace? 
Democracy, political change and civil war, 1916-1992, in American Political Science Review, 
Vol. 95, No. 1, 2001, pp. 33-48; G.D. Fearon, D.D. Laitin, Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War, 
cit., M. Sørli et al., Why is There So Much Conflict, cit.. 
17
 T.R. Gurr, Why Minorities Rebel: A global analysis of communal mobilization and conflict since 
1945, in International Political Science Review, Vol. 14, No. 2, 1993, pp. 161-201; J. Snyder, 
From Voting to Violence: Democratization and nationalist conflict, W.W. Norton & Company, 
New York, 2000; J. Snyder, K. Ballentine, Nationalism and the Marketplace of Ideas, in 
International Security, Vol. 21, No. 2, 1996, pp. 5-40; Y. Sadowski, Ethnic Conflict, in Foreign 
Policy, No. 111, 1998, pp. 12-23; M.H. Chowdhury, Democratization in South Asia. Lessons from 
American institutions, Ashgate, Aldershot, 2003; E.D. Mansfield, J. Snyder, Electing to Fight: 
Why emerging democracies go to war, Mitt Press, Cambridge MA, 2005. 
18
 H. Hegre et al., Toward a Democratic Civil Peace?, cit.. 
19
 J. Snyder, K. Ballentine, Nationalism and the marketplace, cit.; J. Snyder, From Voting to 
Violence, cit.; D.L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups, cit.. 
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It has also been observed that democratization within fragmented societies may 
politicize and institutionalize internal divisions, thus fuelling violence. For one 
thing, existing divisions offer politicians powerful incentives to play the ethnic 
and religious card to mobilize their own constituency. This does not mean that 
divisive policies are there to stay, however: according to some, they can be 
overcome by adopting institutional changes, such as reforms of the electoral 
system
20
. 
The discrepancies that we have mentioned in the studies on the effects of 
democratisation are likely to stem from two factors. First of all, the difficulty in 
defining democracy. The dichotomy between democratic and undemocratic 
governments is far from agreed upon, nor is it clear what constitutes a passage 
between a ‘level of democracy’ and another. Both thick and thin definitions of 
democracy are wanting on many accounts, one of them being that they do not 
capture the extensive web of internal and external factors, of a contingent as well 
as long-term nature, that interact like living organisms, producing complex effects 
that are difficult to analyze, let alone translate into numbers. This leads to the 
second reason why studies on the effects of democracy do not reach an 
agreement: as we will argue in greater detail at the end of the paper, the impact of 
the political system cannot but be time and space sensitive. It follows that to try 
and understand cause and effect as well as variations between one case and the 
other, scholars should not lose sight of local specificities and should be able to see 
them in their historical unfolding.  
 
3. The 1988-1999 ‘democratic phase’ and welfare 
 
The 1988 elections following Zia ul-Haq’s death raised great expectations in 
the West: they were the first free and contested parliamentary elections after over 
a decade of military rule and as such they were seen by many as heralding a new 
phase. The belief that the ‘democratic wave’21 had reached Pakistan was 
heightened by the victory of the PPP. The party was headed by the daughter of 
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, Benazir Bhutto, whose image as a progressive leader had 
been propped up by her electoral campaign, which focused on social emancipation 
and human rights. She and Nawaz Sharif, the head of the PML, alternated in 
power as prime ministers between 1988 and Musharraf’s coup d’etat in 1999. As 
elected leaders they were expected to invest more in the social sector than their 
predecessor. However, World Bank and UNDP statistics indicate that this was not 
the case: in the 1990s public expenditure allocated to health and education 
actually decreased as a percentage of GNP when compared to the previous decade 
                                              
20
 See B. Reilly (Ed.), Democracy in Divided Societies. Electoral engineering for conflict 
management, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2001; see also M.J. Esman, Ethnic Politics, 
Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 1994; A. Rabushka, K.A. Shepsle, Politics in Plural 
Societies: A theory of democratic instability, Charles Merrill, Columbus, 1972.  
21
 See S.P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the late twentieth century, Vol. IV, 
University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, 1993. 
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of military rule
22
. Overall, as a share of the GNP and of total government 
spending, allocations to these sectors remained below the regional average, with 
Pakistan fairing worse than poorer countries that ranked lower in terms of political 
freedom and civil liberties like the Maldives, Nepal and Bhutan
23
. As to 
redistributional policies that are often associated with democratic governments, in 
the 1990s there was an increase in spending on primary education, but that 
increase was in line with what was happening in most of the region under the 
pressure of international aid agencies. 
Statistics also do not take into account ‘ghost schools’, a pervasive 
phenomenon in Pakistan that is the product of a host of factors including lack of 
infrastructure and roads, low salaries of teaching staff, lack of security. The public 
health sector likewise remained marred by absenteeism, lack of meritocracy, 
limited accountability. The underfunding of the public sector and the problems 
hindering its proper functioning led to a growing number of private schools; this 
has been seen in positive terms by US agencies, as a way to circumvent the 
request for more State
24
; however, despite charging low fees, private schools 
cannot cater for the worse off sectors of society
25
. and due to the low salaries of 
their teaching staff they are marred by greater corruption than government 
schools. NGOs and madrasa have increasingly provided support to the poorest 
sections of society, though the quality of education provided by them seems to be 
wanting on many counts: madrasa in particular tend to focus on religious subjects 
and to adopt a mnemonic approach thus fostering an a-critical thinking and 
hindering the access of students to the job market. 
On a positive note, at the end of the 1990s health indicators showed marked 
improvements compared to the beginning of the decade, though this output was 
part of a global trend, led by the UN, that took place also elsewhere irrespective of 
regime type. Improvements in Pakistan were actually less dramatic than elsewhere 
in the region; as a consequence, at the end of the 1990s Pakistani infant and child 
mortality rates were higher than in the rest of the region, including countries that 
had similar or lower pro capita income and that fared worse in terms of political 
and civil liberties
26
. Pakistan compared unfavourably with the rest of the region 
also in terms of educational achievements
27
. 
In sum, there were some positive achievements, though their correlation with 
the political system is doubtful. In any case improvements were very limited, a 
                                              
22
 See World Bank, World Development Indicators 2008, in 
http://data.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/indicators/en (last accessed 13.04.2011). 
23
 S. Gupta, M. Verhoeven, E.R. Tiongson, Does Higher Government Spending Buy Better Results 
in Education and Health Care?, Working Paper 99/21, IMF, Washington D.C., 1999, pp. 10-13. 
24
 N. Naviwala, Pakistan’s Education Crisis: The real story, Washington D.C., Wilson Center, 
2016. 
25
 M. Akhram, J.K. Faheem, Health Care Services and Government Spending in Pakistan, 
Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, Islamabad, 2007. 
26
 UNDP, Human Development Report 2001, hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2001/chapters/ 
(last accessed 03.05.2018).  
27
 World Bank, Pakistan Poverty Assessment, passim. 
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product of the limited commitment of both Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif to 
welfare. How to explain the limited investment in the social sector by their elected 
governments? Contingent problems certainly played a part: millions of Afghan 
refugees had flowed into the country as a consequence of Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan and of the subsequent civil war. These refugees, besides causing 
ethnic and religious tensions in northern Beluchistan, were a burden to the State’s 
resource, especially as foreign aid to Pakistan after 1990 started to decrease. The 
government was forced to borrow from commercial banks at higher interest rates, 
causing foreign debt and debt servicing to raise as a percentage of the annual 
budget
28
. Pakistan’s reliance on the IMF, which had deepened since the 1988 
Structural Adjustment Program (SAP), did not have any positive consequences on 
economic variables. It will be under general Musharraf’s regime in 1999-2008 
that major economic variables will show an improvement, partly a product of  the 
economic boom at the global level
29
. IMF conditional lending, besides failing to 
contribute to economic growth, prompted Pakistani governments in the 1990s to 
cut public expenditures, thus squeezing social spending
30
. The strings attached to 
the structural adjustment package of 1988-91 also led to increases in taxes and to 
the reduction of the support price for essential crops. IMF standby loan of 1993 
and subsequent packages until 1999 were consistent with earlier packages as far 
as conditionality is concerned. Cuts in subsidies and wage restraint were 
accompanied by the freezing of employment in the public sector
31
, at a time when 
power prices were increasing. By 1998, a decade after the launch of SAP, 
domestic savings and investments had increased, but at a great cost: GDP growth 
had decreased and unemployment had increased, together with poverty incidence, 
depth and severity.
32
 
The following table shows the cuts to subsidies and to resources devoted to 
health and education as a share of GDP since 1989-90
33
. 
 
Public Spending cuts on subsidies, education, and health 
Year Subsidies (%FDP) Health (%GNP) Education 
(%GNP) 
1987-88             1.50                                1.0                                2.4 
1988-89             1.66                                1.0                                2.4 
1989-90             1.47                                1.0                                2.2 
                                              
28
 O.B. Jones, Pakistan: Eye of the storm, New Haven CT, Yale University Press, 2002, p. 231. 
29 J. Nasir, IMF Programs in Pakistan (1988-2008): An Analysis, in CQ Criterion Quarterly, Vol. 
6, No. 4, 2012, http://www.criterion-quarterly.com/imf-programs-in-pakistan-1988-2008-
%E2%80%93-an-analysis/ (last accessed 23.01. 2019). 
30
 N. Gera, Impact of Structural Adjustment Programmes on Overall Social Welfare in Pakistan, in 
South Asia Economic Journal, Vol. 8, 2007, pp. 39-64. 
31
 T. Anwar, Structural Adjustment and Poverty-The case of Pakistan, in The Pakistan 
Development Review, Vol. 35, No. 4, 1996, pp. 911-926. 
32
 A.R Kemal, Structural adjustment, macroeconomic policies, and Poverty trends in Pakistan, 
Asia and Pacific Forum on Poverty, ADB, 2001. 
33 J. Nasir, IMF Programs in Pakistan (1988-2008), cit.. 
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1990-91             1.10                                0.9                                2.1 
1991-92             0.94 0.7 2.2 
1992-93 0.73 0.7 2.2 
1993-94 0.58 0.7 2.2 
1994-95 0.35 0.6 2.4 
1995-96             0.64 0.8 2.4 
1996-97             0.54 0.8 2.6 
1997-98 0.48 0.7 2.3 
Source: J. Nasir, cit., on the basis of various Economic Surveys of Pakistan  
The 1990 Gulf War also had negative effects on Pakistani economy, as it 
reduced particularly between 1991 and 1993 the remittances flowing into 
Pakistan, which had previously counted for a considerable share of national 
income
34
. Foreign remittances to Pakistan according to official data declined from 
US$ 1467 million in 1991 toUS$1086 million in 2000/0
35
.  
To make things worse, in 1990, sanctions were imposed on Pakistan under 
Pressler Amendment. The withdrawal of the Soviet forces from Afghanistan, the 
collapse of the Soviet Union and the effects of the weakening of Iran after the first 
Gulf war removed the major concerns of US foreign policy in the region and 
decreased Pakistan’s importance to US eyes. The issue of Nuclear Non-
Proliferation thus became of priority concern for US foreign policy makers, who 
were increasingly concerned that Pakistan-Indian relations might degenerate in a 
nuclear war
36
. Thus, the $564 million of economic and military assistance 
approved for the fiscal year 1991 was frozen, though certain items such as 
humanitarian aid and bank loans and credits for purchase of food and agricultural 
commodities were exempted. Particularly after 1996 US-Pakistan relations did 
undergo some improvement, but the funds flowing to Islamabad never assumed 
the proportions they had had in the previous decade, when Pakistan had been a 
key ally in the proxy war in Afghanistan.   
There were also more structural, long-term factors at play: firstly, the political 
role of the military. The armed forces, which had been since Partition a powerful 
player and had undergone since the 1950s, when the country became a bastion of 
US policy in the region, a process of modernization, had been further empowered 
under Zia in the context of the ‘free world’s support to the mujaheddin. Islamabad 
                                              
34
 M.S. Butt, J.S. Bandara, Trade Liberalization and Regional Disparity in Pakistan, Routledge, 
Abingdon, 2009, p. 52; U. Cock, Y. Sun, Remittances in Pakistan. Why have they gone up, and 
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had become key in the CIA’s distribution of weapons to the Afghan seven 
Peshawar-based parties, and the distribution was managed by the Pakistani armed 
forces and secret services. In the 1990s the army, while not directly in power, 
controlled behind the scenes certain sectors of decision–making and prevented the 
elected leaders from significantly reducing the military budget; as a consequence, 
defense spending between 1988 and 2000 as a percentage of the GDP did slightly 
decrease, but it remained above the region’s average37. One should not assume 
however that the civilian elites, in the 1990s as well as at other times in the 
country’s history, were strongly in favour of diverting resources from the military 
to the social sector: the Indian ‘threat’, Afghan supposed meddling with Pakistani 
internal affairs and the permanent state of instability north of the Durand Line 
were widely thought by Pakistani elites, whether civilian or not, as necessitating 
great investments in the armed forces. 
Other factors explaining the limited commitment of Pakistani elected 
governments in the 1990s to social spending are low literacy levels and the 
prevalence of family/biraderi, ethnic affiliations and clientelistic networks, which 
had the effect of hindering the awareness of socio-economic inequalities and 
structural problems among the population. Besides limiting the pressure that was 
exerted over politicians to adopt welfare policies, these factors limited the horizon 
of elected politicians: the latter had no incentive to address systemic issues that 
would require long-term measures and to cater to the interests of those living 
outside of their immediate constituency. To this we should add that feudal elites 
who were contrary to greater spending on welfare and distributional policies were 
entrenched in the National Assembly, in the government and in the main parties. 
Under Benazir Bhutto, who belonged to a family of Sindhi landowners, rural 
elites were overrepresented in the National assembly to the detriment of middle 
classes and lower income groups
38
. The PPP itself represented to a great extent the 
interests of the Sindhi landed elite. As to the Punjabi business elites who 
supported Nawaz Sharif, they were linked by family ties to the higher military 
echelons and to Punjabi landlords; another major constituency of Sharif was 
conservative religious groups, who had no interest in redistributive politics that 
may erode their material interests and psychological hold over poor communities. 
Saudi support of the PML-N further watered down any redistributive temptation 
that may have been felt within by the party. Besides their elitist bias, both parties 
were dominated by personalities and established dynasties, and continued to 
discriminate against certain ethnic and religious groups. 
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4. Democracy and peace 
 
We have already mentioned that quantitative research on the effects of 
democracy present some inconsistency in the definition of what constitutes 
democracy, and in criteria and periods used for datasets. The analysis of the 
correlation between democracy and ethnic strife is hampered by additional 
conceptual problems, mostly related to the employment of loose definitions which 
tend to confuse religion with ethnicity. While I have dealt with these issues 
elsewhere
39
, I wish to stress here that even if we take at face value existing 
datasets, no correlation seems to exist in Pakistani history between democracy and 
peace. Again, the Pakistani case contradicts the findings of many political 
scientists working on democratization. The datasets commonly used by them, 
such as those by PITF (Political instability task force, funded by the CIA)
40
,by 
UCDP/PRIO (Upsala conflict data programme/Peace research Institute Oslo)
41
, 
and the Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI) all show that domestic strife in 
Pakistan did not decrease during democratic phases. If anything, strife became 
more intense in terms of number of casualties. As we have already mentioned, the 
traumatic 1971 civil war that torn the country apart, resulting in the secession of 
the eastern wing, occurred after the first national elections had taken place. The 
reason is quite obvious: the elections raised the expectation among Bengalis, who 
despite being the majority were marginalized and discriminated against, that they 
would obtain the majority of seats in the National Assembly and form a 
government. However, the reluctance by the military and civilian leaders of the 
western wing to allow the AL to form a government and the badly disguised 
racism of the Punjabi-dominated military precipitated the crisis. While the brutal 
repression of Bengali protestors took place under the military government of 
Yahya Khan, civilian politicians of the western wing did not oppose it. India’s 
military intervention in the civil war may have contributed to the civilian leaders’ 
support of the military. In the aftermath of the secession of the eastern wing, strife 
broke out also in Beluchistan, again as a consequence of ethnic discrimination. 
External support (this time from Afghanistan) helped the insurgents but fuelled 
the Pakistani elites’ sense of vulnerability, prompting them to repress brutally, 
with Iranian support, the insurrection. Beluchi rebellion would resurface under the 
military regime of general Musharraf, in power since 1999, a consequence of 
persisting discrimination against the province and of the increasing influx of 
Punjabi workers and military personnel in the area of Gwadar which was being 
renovated with Chinese support. Also protests and violence by Sindhis, Mohajir 
and Pashtuns have taken place in Pakistani history irrespective of regime type. 
Sindhis and Mohajirs mobilized mostly, but not only, under the military regime of 
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Zia as a consequence of ongoing discrimination fuelled by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s 
demise, of migration dynamics which increased the weight of Pashtuns in Karachi 
and ensuing competition for scarce resources. Anti-state attacks by neo-
traditionalist groups in the Pashtun belt and attacks against religious minorities 
became a severe problem in the 1990s and continued under elected and unelected 
leaders, a consequence of the militarization of Pashtun areas in the 1980s and the 
increasing convergence between pro-Wahhabi groups, jihadists and criminal 
networks linked to narcotrafficking.  
As to inter-state violence, the first India-Pakistan war (1947-1949) took place 
under a civilian unelected government; the following ones (1965 and 1971) under 
military governments, though in 1971 it was democratic India which decided to 
intervene militarily in the Pakistani civil war; the 1999 Kargil war took place 
under Nawaz Sharif, and since then skirmishes along the LoC have often occurred 
irrespective of regime type. 
In sum, international conflict was more pronounced when Pakistan had a 
military government, but took place also during ‘democratic’ phases. As to 
internal strife, no correlation can be observed between violence and a particular 
regime type. If anything, the worst levels of internal violence erupted in the 
1970s, after Pakistan’s first national elections, while religious violence became 
widespread in the 1990s. This may support the thesis that governments 
undergoing transitions to democracy, like hybrid governments, are particularly 
prone to domestic violence. What is certain in any case is that variables other than 
the political system explain domestic strife: among them, ethnic grieviances, 
interferences by foreign countries, and islamization policies that fuel an 
exclusivist and intolerant vision of Islam.  
 
5. Conclusions 
 
After a decade of Musharraf’s military rule, democracy returned to Pakistan. 
National elections were held in 2008, resulting in a PPP-PML-N coalition 
government, and in 2013, with the PML-N winning the majority of votes. In 2018 
Pakistan Tehreek-e Insaf - PTI swept the polls and its leader Imran Khan became 
head of State. In each of these occasions, the elected civilian government was able 
to complete a full term in office and peacefully transfer power to another elected 
government. This has been considered by many observers as a step forward 
towards a fully democratic State, which as such, so the argument goes, will 
produce welfare and peace dividends. Things, however, as we have seen, are 
much more complicated. There is no guarantee that Pakistan will not be touched 
by a ‘counter-wave’, nor that greater democracy will have a positive impact on 
welfare and internal stability and security. We have seen that no clear-cut 
correlation between democracy and welfare, and between democracy and peace, 
existed in the previous decades of Pakistani history. It can be held that democratic 
transitions have lasted too little to take roots and produce durable and significant 
effects: as it has been noted by some political scientists, the stock of democracy is 
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an important factor to be taken into consideration
42
. This points to the shallowness 
of procedural definitions of democracy: what makes the difference, as many 
others have also pointed out, is substantial democracy. However, we are left 
wondering what is the ideal duration of the ‘stock’ for it to produce positive 
results, and what a ‘mature’ democracy would consists of. In any case, it may not 
only the limited duration of democracy that gives Pakistan’s political system a 
hybrid character: although undoubtedly many young democracies have adopted 
the form of electoral democracy while remaining illiberal, it could be argued that 
most regimes are, in Diamond’s words, ‘ambiguous’43. 
While there is no doubt that in the last decade procedural democracy has 
become more entrenched in Pakistan, it must be pointed out that also the latest 
elections were marred by some fraud and rigging, with the military accused of 
tilting the electoral playing field in the PTI’s favour. Although there is no 
evidence that this actually happened, there is no doubt that the actual government, 
like the previous ones, defers to the military on certain issues. As to ethnic 
institutional asymmetry, which has been a constant source of tensions and strife in 
Pakistani history, voting still takes place on the basis of ethnic affiliations: the PTI 
is the largest party in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the PPP in Sindh, the newly-formed 
Balochistan Awami Party (BAP) in Balochistan, and the PML-N in Punjab. The 
ruling PTI, like the PPP and the PML-N, is dominated by personalities and 
displays an elitist bias. And, like previous governments, it has been unable to 
significantly decrease internal violence: attacks associated with Taliban, 
separatists and sectarian militants continue to cause a high number of casualties. 
Nor have Pakistan’s relationships with its neighbours improved. While it is partly 
to the credit of Imran Khan that the recent crisis with Pakistan over Kashmir has 
not degenerated into a full-fledged war, Indo-Pakistan relations remain sour and 
both the Kashmir and Durand Line disputes remain unresolved. As to the future of 
Pakistani democracy, links with Saudi Arabia and China may contribute to 
consolidate the undemocratic features of the Pakistan political system. Western 
support itself has often benefitted military governments: The US and their allies 
supported Zia’s military regime during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan; they 
did so again after 9/11, when Pakistan, then under the military government of 
Musharraf, became a key element in the ‘war against terror’. Given the 
geostrategic centrality of AfPak, and the web of interests by state and non state 
actors centered around it, we cannot rule out that an external power may support a 
military regime if that may further its interests. 
The above observations make it quite obvious, I believe, that studying the effects 
of a particular regime type should entail (also) a contextual and historical 
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perspective. The Pakistani case study indicates that democracy by itself, 
particularly in its procedural definition, is not per se the solution. Presumably, for 
a democracy to result in redistributive policies certain preconditions must exist; 
among them, the existence of an informed and politically aware society, the 
weakening of clientelistic affiliations, the capacity of elected governments to free 
themselves from military oversight as well as from outside pressure to cut 
welfare. As for the correlation between democracy and internal strife, the regional 
and international context must be taken into consideration, as well as the existence 
of grievances by groups who are marginalized and discriminated against, the de 
facto norms regulating access to political power and to scarce resources and the 
image of ethnic and religious minorities in state rhetoric and textbooks. Many of 
these factors cannot be easily assessed, let alone measured. And yet, I believe that 
devoting attention to time and space, and trying to capture the multiplicity of non 
measurable explanatory variables that influence decision-making, no matter how 
untidy and messy it may be, would greatly contribute to our understanding of 
reality. As Diamond observed, classificatory schemes «impose an uneasy order on 
an untidy empirical world»
44
. What I am arguing is not that we should shelve 
classifications, nor that we should do away with statistics and cross-comparisons; 
rather, we should attempt to make more room for that ‘untidy empirical world’: as 
Hirshman observed almost half a century ago, what is needed is «a little more 
‘reference for life’ [...] and a little less wishful thinking»45. 
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